Legal Aspects of SIDS
T. S. ELLIS , Ill, J. D. HARVARD, D. L. OXFORD , Partner, Hunton & Williams, Richmond, Virginia

My remarks today focus on four legal aspects of SIDS ; the first three are problems of
long standing and the fourth is less well recognized, an immediate problem to some but more
of a cloud on the horizon to others .
At the outset, I want to emphasize that I
bring you no certain solutions. Rather , my more
modest objective is to provide a focus and
framework for further discussions.
The first legal aspect of SIDS I want to discuss is the capacity of the legal system to distinguish between SIDS and criminally actionable
infant death caused by neglect, abuse or worse .
Great progress has been made on this problem
since 1 933 when in England , for example ,
SIDS was thought to result from inadvertent suffocation of the infant while sleeping with its
mother. Acting on this myth , Parliament passed
a law stating that sleeping with infants was a
criminal offense under certain circumstances .
Of course, that is no longer the law there or
here and this, I suppose, helps to illustrate that
substantial progress has been made in distinguishing between SIDS and criminally actionable homicide. Still, some relatively recent examples illustrate that the problems our legal
system has in making this distinction may not
be entirely behind us.
The f.irst situation is particularly unfortunate. In 1973 , a young couple in the Bronx lost
an infant to SIDS. The infant was a ~econd child
and delivered by Caesarian section . At the time
of death , the mother was undergoing psychiatric care for postpartum depression and the father was caring for both children at home. The
infant had a cold during the last week of life. On
discovering that the infant had died , the parents
were understandably distraught and for this and
a number of other reasons, delayed three hours
before calling the authorities . An autopsy was
performed and the diagnosis was listed as
"congestion of the viscera ." The cause of
death was noted as " pending further study."
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The parents were taken to a precinct station and questioned by a detective . Inexplicably , the detective misunderstood the father to say that the child had not been fed for
three days. The autopsy , however, made no
mention of dehydration , malnutrition , bruises on
the body or abnormal findings in the liver or
thymus. After the interrogration , though, the
medical examiner noted on the autopsy report
that the cause of death was "abandonment and
neglect.''
On the basis of the detective's conclusion
and the medical examiner's report, the couple
was indicted and then jailed because they were.
unable to post a $1,000 bond. Lamentably, the
father remained in jail for eight months and the
mother for six months before bail was posted .
During this period, the older child was placed
with grandparents. Ultimately, the parents were
exonerated.
By any standard, this is an aggravated
case and I must ~ay that I know of no similar
documented incidents since 1973 . Still, the potential for recurrence of a similar incident remains in those states where the death investigation laws are inadequately sensitive to SIDS as
an identifiable disease entity. The potential also
remains because large segments of the public,
particularly the authorities in some states and
cities , remain relatively ignorant about SIDS.
The second case I shall describe illustrates the opposite facet of failing to distinguish
adequately between SIDS and criminaHy actionable infant death . This case comes to us
through a published decision of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Richmond.* The
decision reveals essentially the following facts :
A foster parent was charged with first-degree
murder and a number of other charges of assault with intent to murder, attempt to murder,
• See United States v. Woods . 484 F.2 d 1 27
(1973).

and mistreatment and neglect of an eightmonth-old, pre-adoptive foster son. The evidence showed , among other things, that the infant spent the first five months of his life in a foster home and that his physical well-being and
health during this period were uneventful and
unremarkable. At the end of the five-month period , the infant was placed in the defendant's
home. Thereafter, a bizarre series of events occurred. On at least six occasions, the infant suffered episodes of gasping for breath and turning blue from lack of oxygen . On all but one of
these occasions, the infant responded well to
mouth-to-mouth resuscitation . On the final occasion , the infant lapsed into a coma and died .
During the hospitalization, no cause for cyanosis could be discovered and at the trial on
the criminal charges, the state forensic pathologist expressed the view that he was 75% sure
that the infant' s death was homicide. He explained , however, that he was 25% uncertain
because the infant could have died from a
poorly-understood disease referred to as "natural crib death."
On that evidence alone , the defendant
might well have escaped conviction. Recognizing this , the government lawyers went on to attempt to introduce other incriminating evidence.
This evidence showed that beginning in 1945,
the defendant had had custody or access to
nine children who, collectively, had experienced
a minimum of twenty episodes of cyanosis.
Seven of these children died, while five had
multiple incidents or episodes of cyanosis.
Three of the children were her own natural-born
children , two were children she had adopted ,
one was a niece, one was a nephew, and two
were children of friends. On one previous occasion , the defendant had been charged with assault and attempted murder, but had been acquitted.
On the basis of this and the other evidence in the case, the defendant was convicted . On appeal , an important issue was
whether the evidence of the other incidents
should have been admitted at the trial. This issue, long debated by legal scholars , is not important to our discussion today . What is important is the near failure of the legal system in this
instance to distinguish SIDS from homicide. For
those of you who are curious, though , let me
say that the evidence was held admissible and
the conviction affirmed. Significantly, though,

one judge dissented, relying in part on the medical examiner's equivocal testimony to the effect
that the diagnosis of suffocation was no more
consistent with the facts than a diagnosis of crib
death . *
What do these cases reflect? The first reflects that the tragedy of SIDS is cruelly compounded when the legal system confuses SIDS
parents with criminals. By the same token, of
course, the second case reflects that those
guilty of abuse , neglect or worse should not be
permitted to masquerade as SIDS parents.
The capacity of the legal system to distinguish properly between SIDS and homicide depends, at least, upon the following basic requirements:
1 . Full legal recognition of SIDS as a disease entity that results in natural death and not
culpable death ;
2 . Provision for prompt, expert and thorough postmortem examination; and
3. Well defined and generally accepted
postmortem findings for SIDS that distinguish
this disease entity clearly from various deaths
by homicide.
Whether a legal system satisfies these
three requirements depends upon the details of
the autopsy or death investigation laws. As
many of you know, the manner in which a death
is handled by a medical examiner or coroner is
largely a matter of state law and varies widely.
Only a few states , not including Virginia, have
death investigat ion laws that are explicitly
"SIDS sensitive. " That is, only a few states
have statutes specifically recognizing or dealing with SIDS.* Many states do not have death
investigation laws that satisfy the three criteria I
just mentioned . Notwithstanding the absence of
SIDS-sensitive legislation , Virginia has achieved
substantial success in dealing with the problem .
This success, it seems to me, is attributable to
the special sensitivity and competence medical
examiners in Virginia have with respect to SIDS.
The second legal aspect of SIDS is closely

* For another court decision involving this issue, see
People v . Nyberg, 24 Ill. App 3d 4 1, 32 0 A. 2d 546
(19 74), reversed, 356 A.2d 8 0 (1 976)
• For an informative study of the state death investigation laws, see Death Investigation : An Analysis of Laws and
Policies of the United States, Each State and Jurisdic tion
[ as o f January 31 , 19 77], DHEW Pub. No. 78-525 2
(1 9 78).
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related to the first; it is, simply, the obligation of ,
or necessity for , the legal system to aid or at
least not hinder the families of SIDS victims in
recovering from the psychological trauma of the
experience. The example I discussed of SIDS
parents in the Bronx jailed for six months underscores how insensitive some legal systems can
be to this problem .
The insensitivity of death investigation
laws to the trauma suffered by SIDS parents has
been studied-in 1975 by Allan Cleveland , a
New Hampshire lawyer, ** and in separate findings conducted under the direction of Dr. Bergman in 1972. * * * In essence, both investigators concluded that the death investigation laws
were largely inadequate in this respect.
Both studies show that the problem is
most likely to arise where the death investigation system of a particular state fails to make
adequate provision for an autopsy conducted
by an expert pathologist familiar with SIDS . A
necessary first step in helping a family to recover is an immediate autopsy. In many instances only an autopsy can furnish the evidence necessary to identify a SIDS death.
Armed with this knowledge, the family 's physician and other counselors can reassure the parents, and the authorities can make unmistakably clear that the child 's death is one wholly
attributable to natural causes .
Notwithstanding this obvious need, Dr .
Bergman's studies reveal that not only were autopsies rarely done routinely but they were performed in only 25% of all cases of sudden
unexplained death of an infant. In an additional
20% of the cases , only deaths involving suspicion of a crime were investigated by autopsy. In
the remaining 55% , autopsies were occasionally performed depending upon the inclination
of the coroner or medical examiner, availability
of funds and other factors.
Dr. Bergman 's study also indicates that
autopsies were frequently performed by persons unfamiliar with SIDS and that death certificates were signed by pathologists in only 27%
of the cases , by physicians not trained in pathology in 30% of the cases, and by nonphysicians in 43% of the cases .
* *Cleveland, Sudden Infant Death Syndrome (SIDS):
A Burgeoning Medicolegal Problem, 1 Am J Law & Med. 55
(1975).
***A . Bergman, A Study in the Management of Syndrome Death in the United States (1972)
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Other exacerbating factors revealed in the
Bergman study include the failure to make autopsy results available to parents and the use of
a bewildering variety of scientific terminology to
describe the cause of death. For example, Dr.
Bergman found that pneumonia and suffocation
were sometimes listed as incorrect diagnoses of
SIDS. He also found that SIDS was the diagnosis in only 52% of the cases of sudden , unexpected , clinically unexplained infant death . On
the other hand , SIDS was the diagnosis in 85%
of the sudden infant deaths where autopsies
were performed by expert pathologists . That is
a telling contrast.
Finally, both Bergman and Cleveland
noted and decried the lack of any legislative
provision for counseling aggrieved parents.
While the value of counseling is generally conceded,* public funding for this service presents
a difficult political question. Why, for example,
should public money be spent for counseling
SIDS parents and not for those parents whose
children died · from cancer, accidents or other
causes?
In summary, the two legal aspects of SIDS
I have discussed so far underscore that the capacity of the legal system to deal effectively with
SIDS depends on fulhecognition, preferably in
statutory form , of SIDS as a disease entity that
results in natural death . Additionally , there is
compelling evidence that there should be a provision for prompt, expert and thorough postmortem examination with well-defined and generally accepted postmortem findings for SIDS
that distinguish the disease from homicide. Legislation should also provide for the cost of the
autopsy to be borne by the state and for prompt
disclosure of the results to parents and to counseling personnel.
In Virginia , we are fortunate to have an enlightened death investigation system.* Problems seem to arise in states that elect local
coroners and permit them to operate with broad
discretion and little supervision . We have a
state-wide medical examiner system and while
there is no explicit statutory recognition of SIDS,
we are fortunate to have physicians and coun*Hoekelman , The Physician 's Responsibility in the
Management of Sudden Infant Death Syndrome, 1 28 Am.
J. Dis. Child 16 (1974); Nakushian , Restoring Parents '
Equilibrium After Sudden Infant Death , Am J Nursing (October 1976).
*See Virginia Code§§ 32-3 1.9, et seq.

selors who are sensitive to the problem and who
use their discretion under the statute to the fullest and most beneficial extent in the SIDS context.
But even states with specific SIDS legislation sometimes fall far short of the mark. Massachusetts, Maine and California, for example ,
leave unclear the parents ' right to receive autopsy results. Oregon has an administrative program that seems to be the most SIDS-sensitive
of all.
The passage of SIDS-sensitive legislation
in Virginia and other states may also be important to the third SIDS problem I want to discuss
today , a medicolegal problem that involves the
effect of the legal system on the ability of the
medical community to conduct epidemiological
studies. Extensive, reliable and uniform data are
essential to an epidemiological approach to
studying the nature, causes and cure for SIDS.
At present , 33 private groups collect SIDS data
that are neither uniform nor mutually coherent .
Surprisingly, there is , to date, no central or uniform data collection organization or entity . This
long-standing need will not be met until at least
1980 when , pursuant to a 1978 amendment to
the 197 4 SIDS Act,* the US Department of
Health, Education and Welfare plans to establish a national uniform collection system . Under
this system, HEW will also establish a national
clearinghouse to disseminate educational materials if Congress provides the funding.
The HEW data collection plan is a welcome addition to the fight against SIDS, but the
national system will be an effective epidemiological tool only to the extent that the state
death investigation systems are adequately
SIDS-sensitive or otherwise equal to the challenge of collecting reliable data.
We come now to the final legal aspect of
SIDS I want to discuss with you today. This is
the one I described as being of immediate concern to some and as a cloud on the horizon to
others. The problem I am referring to is civil
malpractice liability risks for physicians, hospitals and nurses in the SIDS context. Before I review the analytical framework needed to cons ider the problem, let me give you a
hypothetical situation to put things into perspective .
You are a physician , an internist or gen*42 U.S.C. § 300c-11 .

eral practitioner, or perhaps a pediatrician in a
relatively small community in Virginia . A couple
comes to you who has just moved to the community. They have an infant child two months
old. They tell you that this is their second child
and that their first child was found dead in his
crib at three months for reasons they have
never understood. They may show you a death
certificate in which the cause of death is noted
as " crib death " or SIDS. They further tell you
that their first child was premature as was their
second. Next, they tell you they are consulting
you because on four occasions they have noticed that their child has had difficulty breathing
and on two of these occasions the child apparently stopped breathing altogether. On these
occasions, the child seemed to turn ashen or
gray before starting to breathe again after frantic efforts by the parents to blow in the baby 's
face and shake the baby . They are concerned
that this child is in the same danger as their first
child and they seek your advice. You examine
the child and find him normal in all respects.
What do you do and what do you advise the
parents?
To answer these questions, you should refer to two sources. The first is the standards of
excellence in medical care that you set for yourself personally because of your commitment to
medicine as a physician. These standards are
personal and not relevant to our discussion. The
second source is the standard of care expected
of you under the law, a violation of which could
subject you to substantial legal liability .
What is the standard of care the law expects and requires of physicians? The definition
of this standard of care , like the death investigation laws I spoke of earlier, is generally defined
by state law. Three or four decades ago , the
definition was fairly uniform around the country.
It was defined simply as the action or failure to
act by a physician in contravention of the standard of care observed by a reasonably prudent
physician in the same locality. In order to prevail, an injured party had to produce an expert
physician witness who could testify as to the appropriate standard of care for the locality and as
to the defendant physician 's failure to meet that
standard. Further, the expert had to be prepared to testify that the defend ant physician's
failure to meet the local standard of care proximately caused the injury.
In response to a number of pressures, this
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standard was generally modified to include the
notion that a physician had to meet the standard of care in the same or similar locality. This
modification meant that an expert witness could
be brought in to testify who , though not familiar
with the standard of care in the specific locality,
was nonetheless qualified to testify by virtue of
familiarity with the standard of care in a similar
locality Whether localities were similar for this
purpose frequently depended upon the number
of hospitals, hospital beds, similarity in hospital
equipment available and the number of practitioners and specialists.
Until July 1, 1979 , the foregoing standard
generally described the law in Virginia. The last
session of the General Assembly , however.
amended the statute to provide for a new definition .* In essence. as of July 1. 1979 , the standard of care applicable to physicians, nurses,
hospitals or other health care providers in Virginia is that degree of skill and diligence practiced by a reasonably prudent practitioner in the
particular field of practice or specialty in this
Commonwealth. Thus. in the first instance, the
standard is a sta te-wid e standard . Note,
though . that a local standard of care may still
govern if any party proves by a preponderance
of the evidence that the health care services or
health care facilities available in the locality give
rise to the standard of care which is more appropriate than the state-wide standard. The decision maker is the jury or the judge trying the
case without a jury.
Unlike Virginia, some states like California
have nation-wide standards of care so that a pediatrician from New York or Virginia might well
qualify to testify in a California case.
Now, what sources do we refer to in order
to determine the standard of care? In general,
these include at least the following
1 . The practice and procedures actually
being followed in Virginia at the time ;
2. The content and teachings contained in
current widely distributed literature such as Pediatrics. Journal of Pediatrics and the New
England Journal of Medicine. Particularly pertinent here would be the statement of the American Academy of Pediatrics. 61 Pediatrics 6515 2 (April 1978);
3. The training of the physician involved
may be important. Thus, a board-certified neo*See Virginia Code§ 8.01
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natologist may well be held to a higher standard
than a non-board-certified general practitioner;
4. The extent to which the subject matter,
in this case SIDS, is treated in continuing medical education prog rams and other seminars
throughout the state; and
5. The general state of the art in monitoring equipment.
Now. with this analytical framework as
background , let us return to the hypothetical situation I described at the outset. Obviously, it is
intended to raise the question of a physician 's
duty with respect to identifying high-risk SIDS infants and prescribing monitoring or other treatment for them. What . then . should the physician
do in order to comply with the standard of care
in Virginia? No definitive answer is available to
this question , in part because no Virginia court
has specifically addressed the question and in
part because the state of the medical art is
evolving in this area. Despite this, a few tentative observations seem warranted .
To me, it appears that the state of the art
has reached the point where many believe it is
feasible to identify high-risk SIDS infants, particularly in cases involving siblings of SIDS victims
and survivors of near-miss episodes. This, of
course, was the point of my hypothetical situation. The work of Ors. Kelly and Steinschneider
certainly supports the notion that a reasonable
standard of care requires identification of highrisk SIDS infants. Wh ether suc h a standard
should apply to practitioners in rural or remote
areas is less clear. though I think these practitioners would be imprudent to conclude otherwise.
Identifying the high-risk SIDS infant is only
part of the problem. Once high-risk SIDS candidates are identified, what steps should a physician take or recommend? Again . while no definitive legal answer is available, the literature
suggests that monitoring and surveillance are
indicated. Thus. the statement of the American
Academy of Pediatrics is instructive in noting
that apart from specific treatment of any underlying disorder, · 'twenty-four-hour surveillance is
critical to the management of prolonged apnea. · · As th e Academy 's statement notes,
this may require electronic or other monitors,
and the setting for the observation may include
properly staffed acute care hospitals or the infant' s home. Of course. it is not enough to
place the infant on a monitor at home if the per-

sons charged with surveillance are not skilled
and trained in infant cardiopulmonary resuscitation and other pertinent matters. Nurses and
nurse practitioners and other health care providers in the SIDS context risk incurring civil liability unless they are adequately trained to take
the proper action in the event of an episode.
Physicians in rural areas showld consider sending the infant to an appropriate hospital if facilities are not available locally. But home monitoring may be appropriate* where the persons
involved in the surveillance are adequately
trained.
*The question whether to prescribe an electronic
monitor in apl')ropriate situations is sometimes complicated
unfortunately by the question whether such a monitor is
covered by the pertinent insurance carrier. This is frequently
a matter of insurance contract law and beyond the scope of
my remarks here. Some suggest coverage turns on whether
a specific expense is treatment of a condition or prophylactic care;.. I find this distinction unhelpful in the SIDS context.

The physician 's duty in this context seems
to me to have been summed up succinctly by
Dr. Kelly, et al. , in a recent article.
We conclude that infants who have experienced
near-miss SIDS are at great risk of recurrent apnea,
hypoxia, and sudden death. Most deaths can be prevented by supervised home monitoring of respirations and appropriate intervention by parents trained
in resuscitation .•

In closing , I must say I do not know
whether the civil liability problem in the SIDS
context is an immediate one or merely a cloud
on the horizon . It could be neither and the problem can pe avoided permanently by continuing
medical education programs such as this to ensure that physicians and other health care providers in Virginia remain abreast of the latest developments in medicine.
Thank you.
* 6 1 Pediatrics at 5 14 (April 1978).

The Grief Reaction
ELOISE HAUN, M.D., Clinical Assistant Professor of Psychiatry, Medical College of Virginia , Health
Sciences Division of Virginia Commonwealth University, Richmond, Virginia
For most parents the death of their infant
is the first serious crisis in their lives. This event
is regarded by all young parents as more stressful than previous deaths in the family, divorce,
separation , alcoholism , or suicide. The infant
death may be the first death in the family. The
grief reaction is not stereotyped ; it is as varied
as the individuals experiencing it and the families of which they are a part. Several patterns of
grief will be treated here.
One of the features of the grief reaction is
reminiscing. Old people who die have a history.
There are photographs, objects that are meaningful, shoes, dresses, suits and ties are left be-

hind . There are memories. A 3-month-old infant
doesn't have a lot of memories associated with
it. It may have a little toy or blanket. The process of internal bargaining is lost in the SIDS
death . There are limited experiences and a lack
of time associated with the death. Rationalization of the death is difficult because there
was no recognizable cause. There is no opportunity to speculate or predict what might have
been .
This leads us to the subject of guilt which
has been mentioned before many times; the
guilt of the parents and let us not neglect the
physician . I would like to introduce the thought
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